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I.

INTRODUCTION

In apartment 204 Brian is logging on to his laptop. Within seconds, his
computer alerts him of the presence of a strong wireless signal. Knowing he
has internet service, he allows his computer to access the wireless signal he
believes to be his own. Brian proceeds to upload pictures from his digital
camera onto his personal photo website. In apartment 206, Katie finds her
wireless connection to be sluggish and inconsistent. She has experienced
this problem before and finds herself progressively more frustrated each
time this occurs. What is wrong with Katie's signal? Brian is hi-jacking it.
Use of another's wireless signal is a common occurrence in today's
technology based society.' Some users unknowingly use others' wireless
1.

Ned Snow, Accessing the Internet Through the Neighbor's Wireless Internet

Connection: Physical Trespass in Virtual Reality, 84 NEB. L. REV. 1226, 1227-28 (2006)
(citing Robert V. Hale, Wi-Fi Liability: PotentialLegal Risks in Accessing and Operating
Wireless Internet, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. 543, 547 (2005); Benja-
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signals and other users purposely access others' wireless signals.2 In either
case, the rightful user of the signal can, and often does, experience a less
satisfying internet experience due to the increasing demand placed on the
signal by additional unauthorized users.3 The seriousness or importance of
this issue may be questioned; however, it has become a prominent concern
as our society becomes increasingly dependent on technology.
This comment proposes that the unauthorized use of someone else's
wireless signal is tantamount to conversion. Conversion should not be, and
in most jurisdictions is not, limited to tangible property.4 Part H of this
comment discusses the technology behind wireless internet and the general
concepts surrounding the way wireless internet functions. Part I briefly
traces the historical background and modem applications of the tort of conversion. Part V discusses how the use of another's wireless internet signal
amounts to conversion. Part V explores a more comprehensive approach to
the tort of conversion which encompasses the conversion of a wireless signal, and advocates that Illinois adopt this more comprehensive approach.
II.
A.

WI-FI

HOW IT WORKS

In its most basic form, wireless internet technology uses radio waves
to transmit signals and data. 5 Wireless local-area networking or WLANs,
also known as, Wi-Fi, or wifi, stands for wireless fidelity,6 sometimes
called 802.11 technology.7 This technology allows Wi-Fi capable computers to connect to various computer networks and the Internet using a
radio connection rather than the traditionally inconvenient wires. 8 Wi-Fi
radio signals begin at a piece of equipment known as a wireless router or
rin D. Kern, Whacking, Joyriding,and War-Driving: Roaming Use of Wi-Fi and the Law,
21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 101, 109 (2004)).
2.
See Benjamin D. Kern, Whacking, Joyriding, and War-Driving: Roaming Use of
Wi-Fi and the Law, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 101, 104 (2004) (discussing "joy-riders" and "war-drivers" who intentionally use others' wireless signals and
accidental users, like Brian in our opening scenario).
3. See Robert V. Hale, Wi-Fi Liability: Potential Legal Risks in Accessing and
Operating Wireless Internet, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 543, 552
(2005).
4.
See cases cited infra note 70.
5.
Marshall
Brain
&
Tracy
V.
Wilson,
How
WiFi
Works,
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/wireless-network.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2006) [hereinafter How WiFi Works] (explaining the basics of wireless technology).
6.
Kern, supra note 2, at 103.
7.
How WiFi Works, supra note 5.
8.
Kern, supra note 2, at 103.
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wireless access point. 9 The computer's wireless adapter changes data into
radio signals and then sends the data using an antenna.'° Then the wireless
router receives this signal and translates it." The router uses a physically
wired Ethernet connection to send the data to the Internet.12 This process
also works in reverse with the router receiving data from the Internet, converting the data into radio waves and finally, sending the radio waves to the
computer.' 3 Several computers can use one router as long as all of them
have wireless adapters. 4 If the router fails or, more likely, if too many
computers are trying to access the limited power of the router, users can,15
and do, experience interrupted signals or loss of their internet connections.
The area covered by the signal is called a Hot Spot.' 6 Often times,
people refer to public access points as Hot Spots, such as the local Hot Spot
at Starbucks.' 7 However, if you have set up a wireless network in your
home, your wireless range is also a Hot Spot. Data transfer rates vary depending on the Wi-Fi technology in use. For example, 802.1 lb has a rate
of 11 Mbps, 802.11 a has a rate of 54 Mbps, and 802.11 g has a rate of 125
Mbps. 18 The range of the wireless router's signal varies depending on its
strength and various physical obstructions.1 9 Generally speaking, however,
physical objects, such as walls, do not interfere with the signal and thus
transfers between computers in different rooms or even buildings are possible.20 Approximately 300 feet is the normal range of a router.2 1
If all this technology talk has your head spinning, there are some simplified ways to grasp these weighty concepts. Think of everyday items that
access radio signals such as two-way radios or baby monitors. 22 And now
picture that signal's power amplified and connected to your computer.
Now your computer is capable of sharing information with other computers
connected to your "baby monitor" or the Internet. Then picture your
9.

Hewlett

Packard,

Introduction

to

Wireless,

http://h71036.www7.hp.com/hho/cache/6588-0-0-225-121 .aspx (last visited Oct. 27, 2006)
(explaining use of wireless router as a "bridge" that allows computers to connect to each
other and the internet).
10.
How WiFi Works, supra note 5.
11.
How WiFi Works, supra note 5.
12.
13.

How WiFi Works, supra note 5.
How WiFi Works, supra note 5.

15.

How WiFi Works, supra note 5.

14.

How WiFi Works, supra note 5.

16.
Hewlett Packard, supra note 9.
17.
Hewlett Packard, supra note 9.
18.
Hale, supra note 3, at 543. As a rough estimate, for every IMbps about 31
pages of text can be transferred per second.
19.
Snow, supra note 1, at 1232.
20.
Snow, supra note 1, at 1232.
21.
Snow, supra note 1, at 1232.
22.
How WiFi Works, supra note 5.
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neighbor interfering with that signal and thus creating a plethora of problems monitoring your baby, or in this case, connecting to the Internet.
B.

HOW IT'S "PROTECTED" AND STOLEN

There are various practices that can attempt to protect a wireless signal. The two most common forms of protection are the use of Wired
Equivalency Privacy ("WEP") and Media Access Control ("MAC") address
filtering.2 3 Both have been proven to be ineffective. A brief analysis of how
the various forms of protection are intended to work will be provided. Then,
a short description of how they do not provide protection will follow.
WEP is basically a password associated with the router to better secure
the wireless connection. "WEP is based on a security scheme called RC4
that utilizes a combination of secret user keys and system-generated values." 24 Due to the ease of cracking the WEP, vendors have resorted to 128bit encryption as the low end of the spectrum. 25 A 128-bit WEP key is
twenty-six characters long. 26 Although a lengthy password sounds like
hefty protection, "any WEP key can be cracked with readily-available
software in two minutes or less. '27 A simple internet search can return
hundreds of web pages with various suggestions on how to crack WEP
keys. 28 At the Massachusetts Institute of Technology ("MIT"), students
have the opportunity to take a how-to course on wireless hacking. 29
in the computer science
Additionally, it has been extensively documented
community that WEP keys are not secure.3 °

23.
How WiFi Works, supra note 5.
Mitchell,
WEP-Wired
Equivalent
Privacy,
24.
Bradley
http://compnetworking.about.com/cs/wirelesssecurity/g/bldef-wep.htm (last visited Oct. 27,
2006).
25.
Id.
26.

Wikipedia,

Wired

Equivalent

Privacy,

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wired-EquivalentPrivacy (last visited Oct. 27, 2006).
27.
Id.
28.
I performed a Google and an Ask.com search for "crack WEP keys" and retrieved between 30 and 50 relevant sites. Ask, http://www.ask.com/#subject:asklpg: 1 (last
visited Oct. 27, 2006); Google, http://www.google.com (last visited Oct. 27, 2006).
29.
MIT.edu,
802.11
Wireless
Hacking
Course
Description,
http://web.mit.edu/iap/www/iap03/searchiap/iap-4629.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2006). See

also Patrick S. Ryan, War, Peace, or Stalemate: Wargames, Wardialing, Wardriving, and

1 (2004),
the Emerging Market for Hacker Ethics, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 7,
http://www.vjolt.netlvol9/issue3/v9i3_aO7-Ryan.pdf (referencing the existence of "802.11
Wireless Hacking").
30.
MOBILE

See NIKrTA BORISOV, IAN GOLDBERG, AND DAVID WAGNER, INTERCEPTING
OF
802.11
(2001),
COMMUNICATIONS:
THE
INSECURrrY

http://www.isaac.cs.berkeley.edu/isaac/mobicom.pdf. It is true that newer technologies are
emerging in the hopes that the newer technologies will not be as "crackable." However,
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The second common form of perceived wireless protection is MAC
filtering. All devices that have internet capability have MAC addresses. 3
The MAC address, also called the physical address, never changes.32 The
MAC address does not function independently; it functions in conjunction
with an internet protocol ("IP") address.33 Every router has two IP
addresses, one internal and one external, and two MAC addresses. 34 MAC
filtering essentially allows the router to deny certain MAC addresses access
to the Internet and allow other MAC addresses access.35 Unfortunately,
MAC filtering is just as secure, if not less, than WEP.36 MAC addresses
can be "faked" and cracking utilities are widely available.3 7
Overall, surfing the web via a wireless signal is not safe. Newer and
more secure technologies are always emerging, but as soon as the
technology is developed it will be hacked. This lack of security requires
some extra measure of protection for the rightful user and the internet
service provider ("ISP"). That extra security can be found in allowing a
claim for conversion.
III.
A.

HISTORY OF THE TORT OF CONVERSION

THE FORGOTTEN TORT38

Conversion seems to have fallen through the cracks of most law school
curricula and legal scholarly writing.39 Its lack of attention leaves much
these newer technologies, such as WEP2, WEPplus, WPA and WPA2, are similar in nature
and only time will tell how effective they will be.
31.

What

36.

Posting of George Ou to ZDnet blogs, The Six Dumbest Ways to Secure a Wire-

38.

William L. Prosser, The Nature of Conversion, 42 CORNELL L.Q. 168, 168

is

MAC

Filtering?,

http://www.firewaling.com/concepts/MACfiltering.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2006) (on file
with author).
32.
Id.
33.
Id.
34.
Id. (describing the internal and external IP addresses as doors. The internal
address acts as a door from the network to the internet and the external address receives data
from a computer on the internet and then determines if the data will be let into the network).
35.
Id.

less LAN, http://blogs.zdnet.com/Ou/index.php?p=43 (Mar. 18, 2005) (comparing MAC
address filtering to a security guard and a badge where the badge is the MAC address and
the security guard is the router).
37.
Wikipedia,
Wireless
Security,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wireless-security#MAC-ID-filtering (last visited Oct. 27,
2006).
(1956-1957).
Id. nn.l-2 (observing that conversion "has fallen between the two stools of
39.
Property and Torts" and therefore has not been fully taught in either course and that it is only
scantly been covered in legal literature).
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room for confusion and misunderstanding. Additionally, conversion has
proven to be an ever evolving tort with deep ancient roots and inconsistent
modern applications. 40 Conversion originated during Anglo-Norman times,
when citizens had a right to private action against a thief.41 This cause of
action frequently resulted in strife leading to combat.4 2 Soon the King
resolved such disputes through public prosecution by apprehending the
thief and retaining the stolen goods, rather than returning the goods to the
true owner.43 The King's entrance into the prosecution still
left the plaintiff
44
with no remedy, thus alternative actions began to emerge.
One alternative remedy was the action of trespass de bonis asportatis,
which allowed the plaintiff to recover damages for wrongful taking.45
Despite the remedial advantages of trespass, it had a myriad of limitations.46
The paramount limitation on trespass was the restriction of damages.
Damages were limited to the level of interference with possession.4 7
Consequently, if the goods were returned to the plaintiff damaged, the
40.
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A cmts. a, b (1965) (discussing conversion's origin from trover); 1 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS §
2.7 (3d ed. 1996) (comparing conversion and trover to older actions); W. PAGE KEETON ET
AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 15, at 88-90 (5th ed. 1984) (examining
the development of the action of trover); J.B. Ames, The History of Trover, 11 HARv. L.
REV. 277, 277-78 (1897); Prosser, supra note 38, at 169 (explaining the long history of
conversion); Lawrence H. Hill, Note, A New Found Haliday: The Conversion of Intangible
Property-Re-Examinationof the Action of Trover and Tort of Conversion, 1972 UTAH L.
REV. 511, 511-19 (tracing the development of conversion from its historical to its modem
elements); Val D. Ricks, Comment, The Conversion of Intangible Property: Bursting the
Ancient Trover Bottle with New Wine, 1991 BYU L. REv. 1681, 1683-90 (discussing conversion's history of reluctance to include intangible property).
41.
J.B. Ames, The History of Trover, 11 HARv. L. REv. 277, 278-80 (1897). See
also Courtney W. Franks, Comment, Analyzing the Urge to Merge: Conversion of Intangible
Property and the Merger Doctrine in the Wake of Kremen v. Cohen, 42 Hous. L. REv., 489,
495 (2005).
42.
Ames, supra note 40, at 279. This cause of action, appeal of felony, "depended
solely upon the initiative of the injured party who was responsible for discovering the suspect, recovering the stolen chattel, and supervising the thief s summary execution." Hill,
supra note 40, at 513 (citing J.B. Ames, The History of Trover, 11 HARv. L. REv. 277, 278
(1897)). This action of catching the thief with the goods and prosecuting the thief was referred to as catching the thief in "fresh pursuit." Ames, supra note 40, at 280. If the plaintiff
was unsuccessful at catching the thief in fresh pursuit, a trial was held "that could result in
wager of battle in which success depended more on [plaintiff's] strength with a broadax than
the merit of his case." Hill, supra note 40, at 513.
43.
Ames, supra note 40, at 280-81.
44.
Hill, supra note 40, at 513-14.
45.
Hill, supra note 40, at 513-14.
46.
For an action in trespass, the plaintiff must have a right to immediate possession, thus certain situations, such as bailor-bailee, had no action. Hill, supra note 40, at 51415.
47.
Hill, supra note 40, at 514-15.
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plaintiff must accept the damaged goods and was limited to damages of loss
of possession of the goods. or damage to the goods; as a result, recovery
could be less than the good's value.48 Trespass was a remedy for wrongful
taking, and detinue, a parallel remedy for wrongful detention, was also
available.49 Unfortunately, detinue was also very limited.
However, the limitations on trespass and detinue led to the actions
being inconsistently applied by the fifteenth century.50 The result was the
creation of the action of trover.51 Possession of the goods, as with trespass,
was a key element to trover.52 Eventually, trover completely replaced
detinue and became an alternative remedy for trespass. 3 However, trover
and trespass were significantly different. Trover did not require the plaintiff
to retake possession by accepting the return of the goods, but instead the
plaintiff could reject possession and recover full value of the goods "at the
time and place of the conversion" as damages. 54 This difference between
trespass and trover began the modern law of conversion. 55
In distinguishing trover from trespass, conversion further added the
element of dominion. 56 "Under this new theory, the defendant not only had
to deprive the plaintiff of possession of the chattel, but the interference had
to be severe enough to deprive the plaintiff of 'dominion or control over it,'
rather than merely cause minor interference., 57 If the elements were met,
the plaintiff was entitled to damages in the amount of the full value of the
goods.5 8 Through the development of conversion, the right to future
possession of the goods, not just immediate possession, satisfied the
possesory element.59

48.
Hill, supra note 40, at 515.
49.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 40, at 89.
50.
KEETON Er AL., supra note 40, at 89; Prosser, supra note 38, at 169; Hill, supra
note 40, at 514-15.
51.
This action protects against "the wrongful detention of chattels not found" and
derives from the French word for "finding." Prosser, supra note 38, at 169.
52.
Prosser, supra note 38, at 169-70.
53.
Prosser, supra note 38, at 170.
54.
Prosser, supra note 38, at 170.
55.
Prosser, supra note 38, at 171 (discussing Fouldes v. Willoughby, 151 Eng.
Rep. 1153 (Exch. 1841)).
56.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A cmt. a (1965); KEErON ET AL., supra
note 40, at 90; Prosser, supra note 38, at 171.
57.
Franks, supra note 41, at 496 (quoting William L. Prosser, The Nature of Conversion, 42 CORNELL L.Q. 168, 171-72 (1956-1957)).

58.
"Conversion has been confined, in effect, to those major interferences which are
so important, or serious, as to justify the forced judicial sale of the chattel to the defendant
which is the distinguishing feature of the action." Prosser, supra 38, at 173. See also
KEETON ET AL., supra note 40, at 90.
59.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A cmt. b, § 243 cmt. b (1965).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

Although the various elements of conversion vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, the general definition of conversion is "an intentional exercise
of dominion or control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the
right of another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the
other the full value of the chattel." 60 In strict liability torts, such as
conversion, the defendant's good faith is irrelevant. 61 The intent necessary
is the "intent to exercise a dominion or control over the goods which is in
fact inconsistent with the plaintiff's rights. 62 Further, "[ilt is to be assumed
throughout that the defendant has acted with the intent of affecting the
chattel. 6 3
B.

THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN CONVERSION

Originally, conversion was limited to tangible property. 64
Conversion's roots in the action of trover initially encouraged this
limitation. 65 Due to trover's restrictive pleading requirements, 66 and
conversion's descent from trover, courts were reluctant to apply conversion
to any goods other than tangible ones. 67 Additional reasons for limiting
conversion to tangible property include the inability to physically possess
intangibles, the concept that intangibles have no value, the problem that
intangibles are not specific enough, and many other reasons. 68 Today,
however, it is recognized that not only do intangibles have value but that
there is no valid reason not to extend conversion to include intangibles. 69
"The first relaxation of the rule was with respect to the conversion of a
document in which intangible rights were merged, so that the one became
the symbol of the other., 70 Soon thereafter, conversion was "extended to
60.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A(l) (1965).

62.

KEETON ET AL., supra note 40, at 92.

See also Prosser, supra

note 38, at 173-74.
61.
Franks, supra note 41, at 497 (referencing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS 638 n.1 (7th ed. 2000); 18 AM. JUR. 2D Conversion § 3, at 147-48
(1985)). See also Prosser, supra note 38, at 174 n.25.

63.
Prosser, supra note 38, at 174.
64.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 40, at 90-91.
65.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 242 cmt. d (1965).
66.
This has been referred to as the fiction of being lost and found. KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 40, at 89.
Val D. Ricks, Comment, The Conversion of Intangible Property: Bursting the
67.
Ancient Trover Bottle with New Wine, 1991 BYU L. REv. 1681, 1685.
68.
Hill, supra note 40, at 527-32.
69.
Hill, supra note 40, at 533. See also WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, § 15,
82 (4th ed. 1971).
70.
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, § 15, 81-82 (4th ed. 1971) (referencing
several types of this conversion, including a promissory note, e.g., Citizens Bank of Madison
v. Shaw, 65 S.E. 81 (Ga. 1909), a check, e.g., First Nat. Bank of Montgomery v. Montgom-

20081

Wi-Fi SIGNALS CAPABLE OF CONVERSION

include intangible rights to which a tangible object . . . was highly
important.",7 1 In all of these situations, conversion of the tangible object
included conversion of the intangible rights. 72 "The final step was to find
conversion of the rights themselves where there was no accompanying
conversion of anything tangible. 73 As society becomes increasingly
technologically advanced and intangibles become increasingly valuable,
courts have begun to recognize conversion as a feasible action for
intangibles.74 As time progresses and society's valuables become
increasingly intangible, courts will soon be forced to recognize actions for
conversion of all kinds of intangibles.

ery Cotton Mfg., 101 So. 186 (Ala. 1924), a bond, e.g., Knight v. Seney, 124 N.E. 813 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1919), a bill of lading, e.g., Alderson v. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co., 23 S.W. 617 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1893), and a stock certificate, e.g., Pierpoint v. Hoyt, 182 N.E. 235 (N.Y. 1932)).
71.
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, § 15, 82 (4th ed. 1971) (referencing a
savings bank book, e.g., Stebbins v. North Adams Trust Co., 136 N.E. 880 (1922), an insurance policy, e.g., Commercial Credit Co. v. Eisenhour, 236 P. 126 (Ariz. 1925), a tax receipt, Vaughn v. Wright, 78 S.E. 123 (Ga. 1913), account books, Plunkett-Jarrell Grocery
Co. v. Terry, 263 S.W.2d 229 (Ark. 1954), and a receipted account, Moody v. Drown, 58
N.H. 45 (1876)).
72.
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, § 15, 82 (4th ed. 1971).
73.
Id. ("[A] corporation refuse[d] to register a transfer of the rights of a shareholder
on its books." (citing Herrick v. Humphrey Hardware Co., 103 N.W. 685 (1905))).
74.
PROSSER, supra note 72, at 82. See, e.g., Charter Hosp. of Mobile, Inc. v.
Weinberg, 558 So.2d 909, 911-12 (Ala. 1990) (affirming an award of compensatory damages for a drug and alcohol addiction program); Nat'l Sur. Corp. v. Applied Sys., Inc., 418
So.2d 847, 849 (Ala. 1982) (allowing an action for conversion of a computer program); A &
M Records, Inc. v. Heilman, 142 Cal.Rptr. 390, 400 (Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
952 (1958) (permitting action for conversion of recorded performances); Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Connecticut, Inc. v. DiMartino, No. 30-06-42, 1991 WL 127094, at *5 (Conn.
Super. Ct. June 25, 1991) (allowing conversion action for confidential information about
customers copied from a computer database); In re Estate of Corbin, 391 So.2d 731, 732
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (finding intangible interests in a business venture possible of
conversion); Keys v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 494 A.2d 200, 208-09 (Md. Ct. App. 1985)
(permitting an action for conversion of a right to receive wages); Datacomm Interface, Inc.
v. Computerworld, Inc., 489 N.E.2d 185, 194-95 (Mass. 1986) (affirming award for damages
of conversion of magazine circulation list); Tuuk v. Andersen, 175 N.W.2d 322, 328 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1969) (allowing conversion of leasing rights to bowling alley equipment); DeLong
v. Osage Valley Elec. Coop. Ass'n, 716 S.W.2d 320, 324 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (permitting a
case for conversion of electricity); Schnucks Twenty-Five, Inc. v. Bettendorf, 595 S.W.2d
279, 285 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (holding an action for conversion of the use of the name "Bettendorf' to advertise groceries); Benaquista v. Hardesty & Assocs., 20 Pa. D. & C.2d 227,
229 (Comm. PI. 1959) (allowing conversion for a house design idea); Evans v. American
Stores Co., 3 Pa. D. & C.2d 160, 161 (Comm. P. 1955) (allowing conversion for a sports
promotion idea).
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How DOES THE USE OF ANOTHER'S WIRELESS SIGNAL AMOUNT TO
CONVERSION?
INTRODUCTION

"The gist of conversion is the interference with control of the property. 75 When multiple computers are making demands on a limited amount
of bandwidth from the internet signal, inevitably, one, if not all users, will
experience a decrease in speed and sometimes disconnection. At the outset
of the tort of conversion, only property that could be lost and found could
be converted.76 However, the "fiction of losing and finding" has been
eliminated from the consideration of what property can be converted.77 Although originally conversion was limited to tangible property, "this hoary
limitation has been discarded to some extent by all of the courts. ' 78 In the
case of wireless internet, the rightful user's control of the signal can be
greatly interfered with by the increasing demand placed on the signal by
unauthorized users.
B.

VARIOUS INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ELEMENTS OF CONVERSION

79

Prosser, a noted tort scholar, defines conversion as "an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel, which so seriously interferes
with the right of another to control it."' 80 The key to identifying conversion
lies in the level of interference imposed on the chattel. Prosser continues to
discuss some factors to consider when attempting to ascertain the seriousness of the interference. 8' Including:
(a) the extent and duration of the actor's exercise of dominion or control;
(b) the actor's intent to assert a right in fact inconsistent
with the other's right of control;
(c) the actor's good faith;

75.
76.
77.
78.

PROSSER,
PROSSER,
PROSSER,
PROSSER,

supra
supra
supra
supra

note
note
note
note

72, at 93.
72, at 81.
72, at 81.
72, at 81 (referencing Lester Rubin, Comment, Conversion

of Choses in Action, 10 FORDHAM L. REv. 415 (1941)).

79.
I have chosen to examine a handful of varying interpretations of the elements of
conversion. This is in no way meant to be representative of all possible interpretations of
conversion. The choices I have made were merely due to the variations I felt were critical to
an action of conversion for wireless internet signals.
80.
Prosser, supra note 38, at 173-74.
81.
Prosser, supra note 38, at 174.
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(d) the extent and duration of the resulting interference
with the other's right of control;
(e) the harm done to the chattel;
(f) the expense and inconvenience caused to the other.8 2
In comparing the unauthorized use of another's wireless internet signal
to these factors, it is clear that wireless internet can be converted. Prosser
does not require all of these factors to be present, but instead suggests they
are important considerations.83 Therefore, in comparing wireless internet
signals to the factors listed above, it is only necessary that some of these
factors be present. When piggybacking 84 someone's wireless signal, the
unauthorized user exercises dominion and control over the rightful user's
and the internet service provider's signal. 85 The extent and duration of the
dominion and control may vary in determining whether conversion has occuffed.86 The unauthorized user may access the signal for varying lengths
of time depending on his/her internet usage. However, it is likely the unauthorized user will repeatedly access the wireless signal thus increasing the
extent of dominion and control exercised.87
Additionally, when accessing another's wireless signal, the unauthorized user is indeed asserting a right inconsistent with the rightful user's and
the internet service provider's right.88 Through the unauthorized user's
assertion of right, the rightful user is denied full access to the already limited amount of bandwidth which they are entitled. The rightful user loses
control over the speed and connectivity of their wireless signal. 89 The unauthorized user's assertion also harms the internet service provider by denying the internet service provider fees for their services. Prosser states that
82.
Prosser, supra note 38, at 174 (quoting the preliminary draft of § 222A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts).
83.
Prosser, supra note 38, at 174.
84.
Piggybacking is a common term for someone who unrightfully uses another's
wireless signal. There are several terms, varying in meaning, for tapping into someone
else's wireless signal. Joyriders use connections other than their own for various purposes,
such as email, surfing the web, etc. Kern, supra note 2, at 104. Wardrivers implement special software to scan for signals and then record and/or publish the location of the connection. Kern, supra note 2, at 104. Finally, whackers are "users who intentionally access a WiFi network for destructive, malicious, theft or espionage purposes." Kern, supra note 2, at
104. For the purposes of this article, the third party wrongfully connecting to the signal, for
whatever reason, will either be described as piggybacking or the unauthorized user.
85.
Prosser, supra note 38, at 174 (analyzing (a) under the factors important in
considering the seriousness of the interference).
86.
Prosser, supra note 38, at 174.
87.
Prosser, supra note 38, at 174.
88.
Prosser, supra note 38, at 174 (analyzing (b) under the factors important in
considering the seriousness of the interference).
89.
Prosser, supra note 38, at 174.
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the actor must also intend to assert a right inconsistent with the authorized
user's right.90 Prosser also asserts "[i]t is to be assumed throughout that the
defendant has acted with the intent of affecting the chattel." 9' This may
sound as if the unauthorized user must be aware of the right and control
they are asserting and how it is affecting the rightful user and the internet
service provider.9 2 However, Prosser further explains it is not "necessary
that the conversion be a matter of conscious wrongdoing, or an intent to
affect the plaintiff's right. An innocent mistake may be enough. 93 In the
case of wireless signal conversion, the unauthorized user need not be aware
of the negative affect such use has on the rightful user's or the internet service provider's right.
Finally, the unauthorized user's exercise of dominion and control
causes the rightful user expense and inconvenience.9 4 The rightful user is
paying a monthly fee for the ability to utilize the wireless signal and the
unauthorized user's access of this signal is essentially being paid by the
rightful user. The rightful user is therefore paying for someone else to access his/her already limited bandwidth consequently resulting in the rightful
user's inability to utilize their signal to its greatest potential.95 Not only is
this costly to the rightful user, it is also inconvenient. The rightful user is
continually inconvenienced by the unauthorized user's access of the signal.
The rightful user may have trouble connecting to the signal due to the limited bandwidth being hi-jacked by the unauthorized user.96 The rightful
user may experience a sluggish connection. The rightful user may be repeatedly disconnected. 97 All of these inconveniences are caused by the
unauthorized user's access of the wireless signal. And, of course, the internet service provider is being denied fees.98
The Supreme Court of Alabama held that four different actions constitute conversion.9 9 The distinct acts are: wrongful taking, wrongful deten90.
Prosser, supra note 38, at 174.
Prosser, supra note 38, at 174.
91.
In today's society, it would be unlikely that the unauthorized user would be
92.
unaware of the affect of his or her piggybacking, however, it is possible so it must be considered.
Prosser, supra note 38, at 174 n.25.
93.
Prosser, supra note 38, at 174 (analyzing (f) under the factors important in con94.
sidering the seriousness of the interference).
95.
See Wi-Fi Piggybacking Widespread, Sophos Research Reveals Over 50% of
Access,
Internet
Wi-Fi
Stolen
They
Have
Admit
Polled
People
(last
http://www.sophos.com/pressoffice/news/articles/2007/1 1/wi-fi.html?_log_from=rss
visited March 18, 2008).
Id.
96.
Id.
97.
Id.
98.
99.
Raley v. Royal Ins. Co. Ltd., 386 So.2d 742, 744 (Ala. 1980) (Tobert, C.J.,
concurring specially) (finding that a genuine issue of fact existed as to defendant's request
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tion, illegal assumption of ownership, and illegal use or misuse.'0° The acts
of the defendants in the first three instances are enough to prove conversion.10 1 Only the fourth instance requires a demand for the return of the
property and a refusal by the defendant to return it.'0 2 Alabama's broad
approach easily allows an action of conversion for wireless internet. Both
the internet service provider and the rightful user would have two avenues
for a claim. The first would be wrongful taking.10 3 To prove wrongful taking, all that is necessary is the act of the defendant's taking. °4 Therefore,
for conversion of wireless internet, the internet service provider or the rightful user would only have to prove the defendant accessed the wireless signal. The second avenue for a claim of conversion of wireless internet would
be illegal use. 105 Again, all that is necessary is the illegal use. °6 In this case,
the internet service provider or the rightful user would have to prove that
the defendant used the wireless signal without permission or authorization.
"The gist of the action is the wrongful exercise of dominion over
property in exclusion or defiance of a plaintiff's rights."' 1 7 Alabama does
not require that the rightful property owner be fully excluded from his/her
property, but rather that, the defendant's exercise of dominion must be in
defiance of the plaintiff's right.'0 8 Therefore, sluggish connection speed or
disrupted connection would be sufficient to show an exercise of dominion
in defiance of the plaintiff's fights.
Like Alabama, Missouri interprets acts of conversion broadly. In Missouri, there are three ways to prove conversion: "(1) By [sic] a tortuous
taking; (2) by any use, or appropriation to the use, of the person in possession, indicating a claim of right in opposition to the rights of the owner; (3)
by a refusal to give up possession to the owner on demand."' 0 9 Missouri
additionally requires three pieces of evidence."l 0 First, the plaintiff must
prove he/she either had possession or the fight to possession at the time of
for property to be returned); Ott v. Fox, 362 So.2d 836, 839 (Ala. 1978) (deciding that repossession of furniture, equipment and fixtures constituted conversion); Webb v. Dickenson,
165 So.2d 103, 105 (Ala. 1964) (holding that defendant rightfully repossessed a tractor and
therefore there was no wrongful taking).
100.
Ott, 362 So.2d at 839.
101.
Raley, 386 So.2d at 744 (Tobert, C.J., concurring specially).
102.
103.
104.

105.
106.
107.

108.
109.
rier did not
110.

Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Ott, 362 So.2d at 839.

Id.
Nanson v. Jacob, 6 S.W. 246, 249-50 (Mo. 1887) (holding that a common carconvert hops).
Time Plans, Inc. v. Wornall Bank, 419 S.W.2d 491, 495 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967).
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the conversion."l' Second, evidence is required of the defendant's taking of2
rights.'"
the property against plaintiffs will and in defiance of plaintiffs
3
1
conversion.
from
resulting
damages
be
Finally, there must
In Missouri, an action for conversion of wireless internet could be
proven either by tortuous taking or use in opposition to the owner's
rights." 4 Both the internet service provider and the rightful user could
prove they had possession and/or the right to possession at the time the unauthorized user converted the signal.1 5 Neither the internet service provider
nor the rightful user willfully allowed the unauthorized user access to the
signal. 1 6 The unauthorized use of the signal is in defiance of the rightful
user's right to maximum usage of the signal and the internet service provider's right to collect fees for use of its services.' 17 Lastly, the rightful
user suffers damages of slower connection speed and/or loss of connection
to
and the internet service provider suffers monetary
1 8 damages it is entitled
if the unauthorized user purchased the service."
The last interpretation of the conversion elements to be examined
comes from the state of Illinois. To prove an action for conversion in Illinois, the plaintiff must establish that: (1) he has a right to the property; (2)
he has an absolute and unconditional right to the immediate possession of
the property; (3) he made a demand for possession; and (4) the defendant
wrongfully and without authorization assumed control, dominion, or ownership over the property. 1 9 Illinois creates barriers, not found in other interpretations of conversion, for the conversion of wireless internet.
Analysis of the possible action for conversion of wireless internet requires an application of the elements set forth in Illinois. 20 It is not difficult to prove that both the rightful user and the internet service provider
have a right to the wireless signal.'12 Likewise, both possible plaintiffs
have an absolute and unconditional right to the immediate possession of the
signal. 22 The third and fourth elements are more contentious for both the
internet service provider and the rightful user's possible claim.

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Nanson, 6 S.W. at 250.
Time Plans, Inc., 419 S.W.2d at 495.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Cirrinicione v. Johnson, 703 N.E.2d 67, 70 (Ill. 1998).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Some states have held that a demand for possession of the property is
not necessary to prove conversion. 23 Illinois, however, has not been as
liberal in its application of this element. It has determined that a demand by
the plaintiff and refusal to deliver are unnecessary to establish conversion
only where some other independent act of conversion can be shown. 124 For
wireless signal to meet this element, Illinois would have to adopt a less restrictive approach such as not requiring formal words as demand, but allow25
ing for the unconditional right to possession to act as an implied demand.
Similarly, Illinois' strict application of the fourth element is problematic for a conversion claim for wireless internet signals.126 Some courts in
Illinois have held that a conversion claim cannot be alleged unless the
plaintiff is fully deprived of benefit from the allegedly converted property. 127 Fortunately, Illinois has slowly begun to accept the tort of conversion for intangible property. 28 The Northern District cited a case holding
that it was "clear that the claimant was not denied the entire benefit of the
converted property."'' 29 Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged the
tort of conversion as a form of protection for confidential business interests. 130 Keeping in step with the trend not to approach the fourth element
rigidly, Illinois is well on its way to recognizing wireless internet signals
and other intangibles as property possible of conversion.
V.
A.

THE CASE FOR COMPREHENSIVE CONVERSION

BUNDLE OF RIGHTS

Law schools have long taught first year students that any property
must provide its owner with four critical rights: the right to use and enjoy,
the right to possess, the right to alienate, and the right to exclude. 131 Courts
should analyze the intangible property based on these rights, and if the
Nanson v. Jacob, 6 S.W. 246, 250 (Mo. 1887).
123.
124.
Jensen v. Chicago & Western Indian R. Co., 419 N.E.2d 578, 595 (Ill. App. Ct.
1981) (discussing having possession of the chattel as conversion and the independent act
being selling the chattel).
125.
89 C.J.S. Trover and Conversion § 58 (1955).
126.
See Cirrinicione,703 N.E.2d at 70.
See DIRECTV v. Hinton, No. 03-C-8477, 2004 WL 856555, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
127.

Apr. 21, 2004); DIRECTV v. Frey, No. 03-C-3476, 2004 WL 813539, at *4 (N.D. I11. Apr.
14, 2004).

128.
See FMC Corp. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 915 F.2d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1990)
(quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 15, at 92
(5th ed. 1984)).
2004) (citing
129.
DIRECTV v. Ostrowski, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1065 (N.D. I11.
Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 489 N.E.2d 185, 194 (Mass. 1986)).
130.
FMC Corp., 915 F.2d at 305.
131.
See Franks, supra note 41, at 505.
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property fits within the definition, the court should recognize the property
as eligible for conversion. 132 "Without focusing exclusively on the kind of
intangible property at issue, courts could instead focus their attention on
'what proof is necessary to establish the existence of the allegedly converted property."",133 Additionally, in G.S. Rasmussen & Associates v. Kalitta Flying Services' 34 the court articulated a three-prong test to discern
interests that have property rights.' 35 "First, there must be an interest capable of precise definition; second, it must be capable of exclusive possession
putative owner must have established a legitimate
or control; and third,1 the
36
exclusivity.
to
claim
Wireless internet can meet all three criteria set forth by the Ninth Circuit. First, wireless internet is "capable of precise definition." 137 As dis138
cussed above, wireless internet is the use of radio waves to transmit data. 39
Although the use of wireless internet is not limited, it is recognizable.
The internet service provider would certainly meet the criterion of definition in that the internet service provider is recognized as a provider of wireless internet. The rightful user, on the other hand, may have a more difficult row to hoe. However, a right can be precisely defined "in something
such as a permit, patent, or contract showing that someone, somewhere
recognized those claims." 4 Since a contract fulfills this requirement, the
rightful user would meet this prong through their contract or service agreement with the internet service provider. Wireless internet also meets the
second prong of exclusivity.1 4 ' The internet service provider has the obvious capability of exclusive possession and control; otherwise users would
not pay for the rights to access the signal. Additionally, the rightful user
132.
Franks, supra note 41, at 505.
133.
Franks, supra note 41, at 505-06 (quoting Northcraft v. Edward C. Michener
Assocs., 466 A.2d 620, 625 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983)).
958 F.2d 896, 902-03 (9th Cir. 1992).
134.
135.
Franks, supra note 41, at 506 (citing Jeff C. Dodd, Rights in Information: Conversion and MisappropriationCauses of Action in Intellectual Property Cases, 32 Hous. L.
REv. 459, 480 (1995) (discussing the application of the Ninth Circuit's test to intangible
property rights)).
136.
G.S. Rasmussen., 958 F.2d at 903.
137.
Id.
See supra Part II.A-B.
138.
139.
Jeff C. Dodd, Rights in Information: Conversion and Misappropriation Causes
of Action in Intellectual Property Cases, 32 Hous. L. REv. 459, 484-85 (1995) (analyzing
G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs. v. Kalitta Flying Servs. and how the rights recognized were
limited).
Id. at 485. See also Miles, Inc. v. Scripps Clinic & Research Found., 810 F.
140.
Supp. 1091, 1095 (S.D. Cal. 1993) (acknowledging definition in rights defined by patents or
contracts); G.S. Rasmussen, 958 F.2d at 903 (accepting the FAA permit as fulfillment of the
definition criterion).
141.
G.S. Rasmussen, 958 F.2d at 903.
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would again have a claim to exclusivity through the contract. 142 The rightful user's contract substantiates the exclusive ownership right despite the
internet service provider's ability to enter into multiple contracts. 143 Finally, wireless internet fulfills the third prong of establishing a legitimate
claim to exclusivity.' 44 The internet service provider, like the plaintiff in
G.S. Rasmussen, has invested greatly in developing, marketing and providing wireless internet. 145 The G.S. Rasmussen court felt "[t]he degree of
investment-monetary or otherwise-is relevant" in determining the establishment of exclusivity. 146 The rightful user has paid for the use of the signal and has created a contract with the internet service provider. Generally
sufficient to warpayment and contract would develop "a stake in the thing
147
rant invoking the protections of the law of property."
Both internet service providers and rightful users can establish,
through the G.S. Rasmussen test (and "the bundle of rights"), that wireless
internet is property. The continual advancement of technology, and society
along with it, cannot be emphasized enough. In order for the law to even
attempt to keep up with the growing technology and its uses, courts must be
willing to extend the definition of property to include intangibles. Ultimately, "the essential inquiry within the scope of conversion should not be
whether the type of property has been previously recognized by a jurisdiction, but whether the right fits the definition of48property and there exists
some reliable indicia of the right to possession."'1
B.

THE MERGER DOCTRINE

Another indication of property rights existing in an intangible is the
Restatement's requirement of a merged document."49 The reasons for this
requirement are not clear, however, it can easily be assumed that conversion's historical roots with the fiction of losing and finding could provide a
justification for this requirement. 15 0 If the fiction of tangibility is the only
justification for the merger doctrine both the doctrine and the fiction have
long outstayed their welcome.' 5 1 Nonetheless, one should not throw the
proverbial baby out with the bath water and, thus, should recognize that the
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

149.
150.
losing and
151.

Dodd, supra note 135, at 485-86.
Franks, supra note 41, at 506-07.
G.S. Rasmussen, 958 F.2d at 903.
See id.
Id. at 903 n. 13.
Id.
Franks, supra note 41, at 507.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 242 cmts. a-f (1965).
Hill, supra note 40, at 526-27, 532 (discussing the significance of the fiction of
finding).
See Hill, supra note 40, at 527, 532; Ricks, supra note 67, at 1712.
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merger doctrine can be justified through other areas of the
law and, there152
fore, still serve an important role in the law of conversion.
In contract law, the statute of frauds requires that some agreements be
reduced formally to writing; similarly, the merger doctrine requires a
document that "authenticates the existence of the inherent right and property's ownership."' 53 Additionally, the law of negotiable instruments also
relies on documentation to indicate the "singularity and permanence of the
right."' 54 Comparably, through the merger doctrine, rightful owners can
prove their right to possession through the document and ultimately demonstrate superiority over the attempted dominion and control of the converter. 155 Finally, the merger doctrine can also find rationale in notice statutes for real property. 56 As a strict liability tort, the merger doctrine could
essentially provide constructive
notice of ownership similar to the real
157
property recording statutes.
Although no widespread recording system exists for intangible personal property beyond intellectual property protection, the existence of a document indicating a right to possession can effectively provide constructive notice and potentially dissuade a "good faith" would-be converter from
pursuing a mistaken "claim of ownership ... inconsistent
with the original owner's.' ' 58 As long as the document that
evidences the right to possession theoretically can be produced, located, or known, notice should be deemed constructive. 159

152.
153.
154.

Franks, supra note 41, at 508.
Franks, supra note 41, at 509.
Franks, supra note 41, at 509 (referencing David Frisch & Henry D. Gabriel,

Much Ado About Nothing: Achieving Essential Negotiability in an ElectronicEnvironment,
31 IDAHO L. REv. 747, 747-49, 757 (1995); Christopher B. Woods, Comment, Commercial
Law: Determining Repugnancy in an Electronic Age: Excluded Transactions Under Elec-

tronic Writing and Signature Legislation,52 OKLA. L. REv. 411, 449 (1999)).
155.
See Christopher B. Woods, Comment, Commercial Law: Determining Repug-

nancy in an Electronic Age: Excluded Transactions Under Electronic Writing and Signature

Legislation, 52 OKLA. L. REv. 411,449, 450, 455 (1999).
156.

See generally JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 685-87 (5th ed.

157.

Id.

2002) (discussing the various notice statutes for real property, such as race statutes, notice
statutes, and race-notice statutes).

158.
Eric Kohm, Comment, When "Sex" Sells: Expanding the Tort of Conversion to
Encompass Domain Names, 23 Loy. L.A. ENT.L. REv. 443, 449 (2003) (quoting RICHARD
A. EPSTEIN, TORTS § 1.12.1 (1st ed. 1999)).

159.

Franks, supra note 41, at 508.

2008]

Wi-Fl SIGNALS

CAPABLE OF CONVERSION

The tangibility of the document under the merger doctrine should not
be considered.' 6° "The real inquiry should be whether media exist in relation to the intangible that gives a potential converter notice of the existing
right of possession, while also authenticating and providing evidence of
their right of possession."' 6' As long as there is some form of reliable indicia, be it the merger doctrine or some other means, of the right 62to possession, the tort of conversion should evolve to include intangibles.
Although the concept of the merger doctrine seems basic, in today's
advancing society it may not easily be satisfied. Today many, if not most,
documents are electronic and the question of whether electronic documents
satisfy the merger requirement was addressed head on in Kremen v.
Cohen.163 During the infant stages of the Internet, Network Solutions, Inc.
("NSI") held the exclusive right to register domain names.164 NSI offered
domain names "on a first-come, first-served basis" for free. 165 In May
1994, through an electronic form, Gary Kremen registered the domain name
"sex.com" with NSI. 166 As is evident by the domain name itself, it had great
potential to become an obvious pornography site and unbeknownst to Mr.
Kremen it became just that. 67 Kremen's intentions were quite different in
that he planned on devoting the site to public health issues. 168 However,
Kremen's good intentions were not realized quickly enough and Mr. Cohen
seized the day. 169 Mr. Cohen forged a letter claiming to be from Mr. Kremen's company that turned over Mr. Kremen's rights to the domain
name. 70 Mr. Cohen sent this fraudulent letter to NSI and without any questions NSI turned the domain name over to Mr. Cohen.' 7' "Although Kremen was able to regain possession of the now-tainted name, he was unable
to enforce his civil judgment against Cohen, who had apparently left the

160.
Franks, supra note 41, at 510.
161.
Franks, supra note 41, at 510.
162.
Ricks, supra note 67, at 1712, 1714.
163.
Kremen v. Cohen, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1170-76 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (granting
motion for summary judgment against plaintiffs conversion claim), rev'd, 337 F.3d 1024,
1026-36 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a claim for conversion existed).
164.
Kremen v. Cohen, 325 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2003).
165.
Franks, supra note 41, at 490.
166.
Kremen, 325 F.3d at 1039.
167.
Id.
168.
See Cohen v. Carreon, No. CV-00-235-ST, 2001 WL 34047033, at *1 (D. Or.
Mar. 9, 2001).
169.
Id.
170.
Kremen, 325 F.3d at 1039.
171.
Id.
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country along with his 'sex.com' profits." 172 Mr.173 Kremen subsequently
went after NSI for conversion of the domain name.
The district court dismissed Mr. Kremen's conversion claim and
granted NSI summary judgment notwithstanding Mr. Kremen's inability to
enforce his judgment against Mr. Cohen. 174 The district court found that
California followed the merger doctrine and a domain name could not be
converted because it lacked merger with a document. 175 On appeal to the
Ninth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit originally attempted to pass the buck to the
California Supreme Court; however, the California Supreme Court denied
the request. 176 Using the G.S. Rasmussen test, the Ninth Circuit decided
that a domain name passed the test of being property subject to conversion. 177 Although the Ninth Circuit determined that California did not require merger, the court still concluded that the merger doctrine would be
met in this case. 178 The Domain Name System ("DNS") registry is an electronic database that links a domain name to the host computer on the Internet. 79 "The fact that the DNS 'is stored in electronic form rather than on
ink and paper is immaterial' because
the Restatement does not require the
180
merged document to be tangible."'
In following suit with the Ninth Circuit decision, both users and internet service providers could satisfy the merger doctrine through the internet
service provider's service agreements. Although many of these agreements
are electronic, under the Ninth Circuit's holding, these documents would
satisfy the merger doctrine.' 81 The service agreement clearly serves as
documentation of the authorized user's rights. Additionally, the service
agreement also solidifies the internet service provider's rights. Many, if not
most, internet service providers require the subscriber to encrypt his/her
wireless signal. 82 Despite the ineffective security measures of encryption,
this agreement serves to prove that internet service providers do not author172.
Franks, supra note 41, at 490-91 (citing Kremen, 325 F.3d at 1049; Kremen v.
Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003)).
173.
Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1029-36 (9th Cir. 2003).
174.
Kremen v. Cohen, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1172-74 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
175.
Id. at 1173.
176.
Kremen, 325 F.3d at 1038 (certifying to the California Supreme Court the question of whether conversion applied to domain names); Kremen v. Cohen, No. S 112591, 2003
Cal. LEXIS 1342, at *1 (Cal. Feb. 25, 2003) (en banc) (denying the request).
177.
Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1030 (citing G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs. v. Kalitta Flying
Servs., 958 F.2d 896, 903 (9th Cir. 1992)).
178.
Id. at 1030-34.
179.
Id. at 1033-34.
180.
Franks, supra note 41, at 514 (quoting Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1034 n. 11).
181.
See Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1034.
182.
S. Gregory Herman, One or More Wireless Networks are Available: Can ISPs
Recover for UnauthorizedWi-Fi Use Under Cable Television PiracyLaws? 55 CATH. U. L.
REV. 1095, 1127 n.219 (2006).
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ize third-party use. 183 By not approving of unauthorized use, internet service providers are effectively claiming their rights through the service
agreement, thus satisfying the merger doctrine.
C.

STEALING SATELLITE SIGNALS

Although Illinois has long been bound to a history of restrictive interpretation of conversion, 184 several Illinois courts have recognized the legitimacy of a conversion claim for intangible property. 85 This willingness
to consider conversion for intangible property has encouraged a string of
suits brought by DIRECTV, Inc. (DIRECTV) 186 for conversion of satellite
signals. 187 It is possible that Illinois is beginning to follow the trend of other
jurisdictions in recognizing the possibility of conversion of intangible property.188 A claim for satellite signals is not all that bizarre, seeing as a federal
district court maintained a claim for conversion of a television signal.189
However, Illinois still has a long way to go before it is willing to fully
embrace conversion of intangible property. Illinois' fourth element of conversion is most problematic for DIRECTV's hopes of a claim for conversion.1 90 The argument against a conversion claim for DIRECTV is that

183.
Id. See discussion supra Part II.B (discussing the ease of breaking encryption).
184.
"[An action for conversion lies only for personal property which is tangible, or
at least represented by or connected with something tangible." In Re Thebus, 483 N.E.2d
1258, 1260 (Ill. 1985) (quoting 18 AM. JUR. 2D Conversion § 9, at 164 (1965)).
185.
See, e.g., Bilut v. Northwestern Univ., 692 N.E.2d 1327 (Ill. App. Ct., 1st Dist.
1998) (considering the possibility of plagiarism in a research paper as conversion); Stathis v.
Geldermann, Inc., 692 N.E.2d 798 (I11.App. Ct., 1st Dist. 1998) (allowing ownership and
control of a business as a claim for conversion); Conant v. Karris, 520 N.E.2d 757 (Ill. App.
Ct., 1st Dist. 1987) (permitting a conversion claim for information from a computer file to
continue).
186.
DIRECTV is a satellite television provider.
187.
See DIRECTV, Inc. v. Treworgy, 373 F.3d 1124 (11 th Cir. 2004); DIRECTV v.
Ostrowski, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. I11.2004); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Vanderploeg, No. 04C-3883, 2005 WL 497797 (N.D. I11.Mar. 2, 2005); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Gatsiolis, No. 03-C3534, 2003 WL 22111097 (N.D. I1l. Sept. 10, 2004); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Klein, No. 03-C8090, 2004 WL 1243952 (N.D. I11.June 2, 2004); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Dillon, No. 03-C85758, 2004 WL 906104 (N.D. I11.Apr. 27, 2004); DIRECTV v. Hinton, No. 03-C-8578,
2004 WL 856555 (N.D. I11.Apr. 21, 2004); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Frey, No. 03-C-3476, 2004
WL 813539 (N.D. I11.Apr. 14, 2004); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Dryhaug, No. 03-C-8389, 2004
WL 626822 (N.D. I11.Mar. 26, 2004).
188.
See supra note 70.
189.
See Quincy Cablesystems, Inc. v. Sully's Bar, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 838, 848 (D.
Mass. 1986).
190.
See Cirrinicione v. Johnson, 703 N.E.2d 67, 70 (I11.1998) (holding the fourth
element of conversion to be the defendant wrongfully and without authorization assumed
control, dominion, or ownership over the property).
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DIRECTV was not deprived of any benefit from its property and, thus, the
claim does not meet the fourth element. 91
The problematic element, however, has not stopped intangible conversion claims dead in their tracks. In DIRECTV, Inc. v. Ostrowski, Judge
Filip embarked upon an enlightening analysis of Illinois precedent determining that Illinois law supports an allegation for conversion of a satellite
signal. 192 The problematic element became Judge Filip's focus as he discussed DIRECTV's right of exclusive control despite its continued benefit
of the satellite signal.193 Judge Filip noted the vastly divergent responses of
courts within his district to a claim for conversion of satellite signals. 94 He
acknowledged five courts having held that a cause of action for conversion
does not lie' 95 and three courts having held that it does lie. 19697 Due to this
discord, Judge Filip appropriately turned to Illinois caselaw. 1
Judge Filip first turned to In re Thebus' 98 and unfortunately found little
clarity.' 9 9 Seemingly conflicting statements in Thebus brought Judge Filip
to conclude "Thebus does not by itself make clear whether intangible property ever can properly be the subject of conversion in Illinois or if so, in
what circumstances.'' 200 Dissatisfied with this uncertainty, Judge Filip
turned to additional caselaw for direction.2 °'
He next looked at a first district decision that did not allow for dismissal of a conversion claim for confidential information.2 °2 Although this
seemed hopeful to Judge Filip, "the tangible versus intangible property is191.
See, e.g., Hinton, 2004 WL 856555, at *4; Frey, 2004 WL 813539, at *4.
192.
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Ostrowski, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1062-65 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
193.
Id. at 1064.
194.
Id. at 1062.
Id. (referencing Hinton, 2004 WL 856555, at *4; Frey, 2004 WL 813539, at *4;
195.
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Maraffino, No. 03-C-3441, 2004 WL 170306, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23,
2004); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Castillo, No. 03-C-3456, 2004 WL 783066, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 2,
2004); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Patel, No. 03-C-3442, 2003 WL 22682443, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
12, 2003)).
Ostrowski, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1062-63 (referencing DIRECTV, Inc. v. Dillon,
196.
No. 03-C-85758, 2004 WL 906104 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 2004); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Dryhaug,
No. 03-C-8389, 2004 WL 626822, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2004); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Delaney, No. 03-C-3444, 2003 WL 24232530, at *8-10 (N.D. I11.Nov. 20, 2003)).
197.
Ostrowski, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1063.
198.
In re Thebus, 483 N.E.2d 1258 (I11.1985).
Ostrowski, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1063.
199.
Id. (comparing two quotes from In re Thebus: "It is ordinarily held ... that an
200.
action for conversion lies only for personal property which is tangible, or at least represented
by or connected with something tangible" and "the subject of conversion is required to be an
identifiable object of property of which the plaintiff was wrongfully deprived." In re The1985)).
bus, 483 N.E.2d 1258, 1260 (I11.
201.
Ostrowski, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1063.
Id. (citing to Conant v. Karris, 520 N.E.2d 757 (I11.App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1987)).
202.
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sue appears to not have been squarely litigated., 20 3 Dissatisfied with this
lack of precedent, but not dismayed, Judge Filip pressed onward to subsequent caselaw that gave Thebus some teeth. 20 4 Relying on Conant, Stathis
held that intangible property could be subject to conversion. 20 5 Judge Filip
then recognized that the courts that have held an action for conversion of a
satellite signal as possible have "analogized the deprivation of right of the
plaintiff in Conant ... with the deprivation of the 'right of exclusive control' Plaintiff
[DIRECTV] was deprived of with respect to its satellite pro2 6
gramming.

0

Judge Filip further turned to FMC Corp. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., a
Seventh Circuit decision, for additional supporting guidance.0 7 Judge Filip
noted that FMC Corp. cited Conant as "what appears to be the modern
trend of state law" allowing for conversion of intangible property. 2 8 Further, Judge Filip recognized the Seventh Circuit's absence of any form of a
requirement where the plaintiff is "clearly deprived of the ability to obtain
any benefit" from the allegedly converted property. 209 Judge Filip also illuminated an example used by the Seventh Circuit where it was evident the
plaintiff had not been denied the entire benefit of the allegedly converted
property. 2 10 The Seventh Circuit recognized the essence of conversion as
being the "intent to exercise dominion or control over the goods which is in
fact inconsistent with the plaintiff's rights."2 1 ' In light of his analysis,
Judge Filip held that although DIRECTV had not been deprived of all benefit of its satellite programming, it was also true that unauthorized use of the
signal was inconsistent with DIRECTV's rights.21 2

203.
Ostrowski, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1063.
204.
Id. (citing to Stathis v. Geldermann, Inc., 692 N.E.2d 798 (I11.App. Ct. 1st Dist.
1998)).
205.
Stathis, 692 N.E.2d at 807.
206.
Ostrowski, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1064 (referencing DIRECTV, Inc. v. Delaney,
No. 03-C-3444, 2003 WL 24232530, at *9-10 (N.D. I11.Nov. 20, 2003)).
207.
Id. (citing FMC Corp. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 915 F.2d 300 (7th Cir.
1990)).
208.
Id. at 1065 (citing FMC Corp., 915 F.2d at 305 (citing Conant v. Karris, 520
N.E.2d 757 (Itl. App. Ct. 1987))).
209.
Id. (citing DIRECTV v. Hinton, No. 03-C-8477, 2004 WL 856555, at *4 (N.D.
I11.Apr. 21, 2004)).
210.
Ostrowski, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1065 (citing Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 489 N.E.2d 185, 194 (Mass. 1986)) (where the property converted involved
a copy of a magazine circulation list and although the claimant retained its own copy of the
list, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that the competing magazine could be held
liable for conversion).
211.

FMC Corp., 915 F.2d at 304 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET A.., PROSSER AND

KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 15, at 92 (5th ed. 1984)).
212.
Ostrowski, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1065.
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The use of satellite signals for television programming is analogous to
wireless internet. The way satellite television works is that a satellite dish,
placed outside a viewer's home, receives transmissions from DIRECTV or
other satellite companies.2 13 These transmissions, or signals, are then sent to
a receiver inside the viewer's home that connects to the television.21 4 This is
similar to the way computers receive wireless internet signals. The router
acts somewhat like the satellite and the computer's wireless adapter acts
like the receiver. 215 Also like computer internet
service216providers, satellite
•
companies provide varying degrees of service for a fee.
Satellite signals and wireless internet signals also have similar problems when it comes to cracking down on unauthorized use. The "know
how" of stealing both satellite television signals and wireless internet signals can be easily found on the Internet. 1 7 The ease of access to learning
how to steal these signals is not the only problem. DIRECTV also has the
problem of being unable to determine when its signals are being hijacked.21 8 Similarly, there are no "tell tale signs" of when wireless signals
are being misused. For wireless internet, the authorized user's decreased
quality of use can be a sign of Wi-Fi piggybacking, but it is certainly not an
absolute sign.21 9
Despite these problems, several Illinois courts have been willing to
recognize a claim of conversion for satellite television signals.22 0 Through
the above analogy of satellite television signals and wireless internet signals, it follows that courts should be willing to recognize a claim for wireless internet signals. Although the advancement of technology occurs at
rapid speed and the advancement of the law occurs at a significantly slower
pace, technological advancement demands legal response and remedies.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Brian's connection to Katie's wireless signal is conversion. Although
Brian may have unknowingly connected to Katie's signal rather than his
own, the tort of conversion does not require the knowing intent of converting the property, just merely the intent to exercise dominion or control over
213.
214.
215.
216.

Hinton, 2004 WL 856555, at *1.
Id.
See discussion supra Part II.A.
See Clayton P. Kawski, The Satellite TV Pirate'sBooty: Theft and Conversion

of Intangible Property in Illinois, B. BRIEFS: KANE COUNTY BAR Assoc., Oct. 2007, at 30,

30.

217.
Id. See discussion supra Part II.B.
218.
Clayton P. Kawski, The Satellite TV Pirate's Booty: Theft and Conversion of
IntangibleProperty in Illinois, B. BRIEFS: KANE CouNTY BAR Assoc., Oct. 2007, at 30, 30.
219.
See discussion supra Part IV.A.
220.
See supra note 183.
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said property. 22 This may seem harsh; however, considering the rapid progression of technology, and the benefits that come with it, we as a society
must also be willing to accept the consequences and additional responsibilities of such advances. Brian may have to "outsmart" his Windows operating system telling him to automatically connect to the strongest signal and
simply verify that he is connecting to his own signal by reading the name or
title of the signals prior to connecting.2 22 Use of another's wireless signal
should result in an actionable conversion.
Wi-Fi, in its most basic form, operates much like "walkie-talkies" or
baby monitors. 223 Rather than the multitude of wires traditionally used to
connect to the Internet, Wi-Fi uses the transmission of radio waves.22 4
Through the use of various pieces of equipment, such as routers and wireless adapters, the radio waves' signals are translated.22 5 The current modes
of protecting wireless signals are virtually ineffective.22 6 This lack of pro228
2 27
tection causes harm to authorized users and internet service providers.
The tort of conversion can provide a remedy to this harm. Despite
conversion's lack-luster history,2 9 it has proven to be flexible and necessary.230 Due to conversion's strict liability element,231one may suggest that
an action in trespass would be more appropriate.232 However, the limitation
of damages for trespass would leave both authorized users and internet service providers very little, if any, remedy at all.233 In trespass, once the
221.
See supra note 61.
222.
Often Windows will alert you, through a pop-up bubble on the bottom right of
your screen, that there are available wireless signals. By clicking on the bubble Microsoft

takes you to a list of available wireless networks. Here you can verify that you are con-

nected or attempting to connect to your wireless network. See Microsoft, MSBBN: How To

Troubleshoot Wireless Connection Problems: Verify that the Wireless Network is Available,

http://support.microsoft.com/kb/831770/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2005) (explaining the network
name (SSID)).
223.
How WiFi Works, supra note 5.
224.
See Kern, supra note 2, at 103; How WiFi Works, supra note 5.
225.
Hewlett Packard, supra note 9; How WiFi Works, supra note 5.
226.
See BORISOV ET AL., supra note 30.

227.
"The Wi-Fi operator [authorized user] may experience delayed Internet transmission or receive viruses from the joyriding [unauthorized user] neighbor." Snow, supra
note 1, at 1263.
228.
See Kern, supra note 2, at 110 (discussing the impact unauthorized users have
on ISPs).
229.
See Prosser, supra note 38, at 168.
230.
See supra note 40; supra note 50 (discussing the limitations on trespass and
trover). See generally discussion supra Part III.B.

231.
See supra note 61.
232.
See Snow, supra note 1, at 1226 (arguing for an action in trespass for unauthorized use of another's wireless signal).
233.

Hill, supra note 40, at 514 (explaining the limitation being the level of interfer-

ence with possession).
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goods were returned, the plaintiff was required to accept the goods and
merely recover for damages of loss of possession or damage to the goods
themselves.2 34 Trespass' remedy may result in the continual offense of
unauthorized use due to the minimal damages likely being less than the
subscription to an internet service provider with wireless internet service.
Additionally, the measuring of such damages would likely prove to be exceedingly difficult considering the problem of even detecting unauthorized
use. 235 Despite the difficulty of detecting unauthorized use, if unauthorized
use is detected, conversion would be the most appropriate means of action
due to its remedy.236 Through the traditional approach to conversion2 37 and
several current state law approaches 238 wireless internet signals are actionable for conversion.
The age-old analysis of property as a bundle of rights provides for an
action of conversion for wireless internet signals. 239 In determining if wireless signals even constitute property the G.S. Rasmussen test indeed determines that Wi-Fi is property and thus capable of conversion. 24 Even under
the now often applied merger doctrine of the Restatement, 24' wireless signals are linked to documentation proving Wi-Fi's property elements, and
242
both the authorized user and the internet service provider's rights.
Through the Ninth Circuit's decision in Kremen, electronic documents,
such as internet service provider service 243
agreements, are documents that
can meet the merger doctrine requirement.
Additionally, the recent decisions in Illinois regarding DIRECTV encourage the inclusion of wireless signals as property capable of conversion. 244 Although DIRECTV had not been fully deprived of its use of the
signal, an action for conversion was still valid. 245 Satellite television signals and wireless internet signals are closely analogous, and thus, if an ac234.
Hill, supra note 40, at 514.
235.
See Kern, supra note 2, at 104.
236.
Prosser, supra note 38, at 173.
237.
See discussion supra Part IV.B (analyzing Prosser's definition and application
of conversion).
238.
See discussion supra Part IV.B (comparing and applying the elements of conversion to wireless internet from the states of Alabama, Missouri, and Illinois).
239.
See discussion supra Part V.A.
240.
See discussion supra Part V.A (applying the bundle of rights theory and the test
articulated by G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs. v. Kalitta Flying Servs., 958 F.2d 896, 903 (9th
Cir. 1992)).
241.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 242 (1965).

242.
See discussion supra Part V.B.
243.
See discussion supra Part V.B (considering the application of Kremen v. Cohen,
337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003)).
244.
See discussion supra Part V.C.
245.
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Ostrowski, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1065 (N.D. I11.2004).
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tion for conversion lies for satellite signals it would necessarily follow that
the action would also lie for wireless internet signals.246
The concern for stopping piggybacking does not start or end with the
inconveniences experienced by the authorized user and internet service
provider. If an unauthorized user commits criminal acts over the Internet
with the use of the authorized user's wireless signal, the act can be traced
back to the authorized user.247 In one case, a neighborhood boy tapped into
a wireless signal and sent death threats via e-mail to his principal. 248 "In
another Florida case, a man in an apartment complex used a neighbor's WiFi to access bank information and pay for pornography sites., 249 In 2003 a
Michigan man was convicted of using a wireless network to steal credit
card numbers from a Lowe's home improvement store. 250 Now is it threatening to think someone may be tapping into your wireless signal?
It is important for the law to provide remedies for every type of
wrongdoing. Due to the current and ever-growing technology boom, many
wrongs can go undetected and unpunished. "Although it is customary for
the law to lag behind and then ride on the coattails of societal progress, the
rapid evolution of technology threatens to make the gap between law and
society increasingly wide."I2 5 Illinois, and other states, need to recognize
the need for the law to catch up, or at least chase after, the emerging property rights technology creates. By applying the bundle of rights and even
the merger doctrine to advancing technology such as wireless internet, Illinois will recognize the need for the action of conversion on such forms of
property. Not only will wireless internet form the basis for a claim, but by
broadening the application of conversion, states can anticipate future forms
of intangible property and be prepared with the appropriate remedy of conversion.
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246. See discussion supra Part V.C.
247.
This is possible because all online connections produce an internet protocol
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